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Fencing Out Politically Unpopular Groups from the
Normal Political Processes:
The Equal Protection Concerns of Colorado
Amendment Two
CRAIG CASSIN BURKE*
To specially shield discriminatory practices from the normal political
processes of change is no[t] consistent with the injunction of the Four-
teenth Amendment that "No state shall deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.["] In the circumstances,
withdrawing the usual avenues of redress which the law provides in other
cases works a serious inequality [W]e submit the State cannot so
disadvantage the victims of invidious personal discrimination.
-Thurgood Marshall'
INTRODUCTION
Election year 1992 produced mixed results for at least one politically
unpopular group: gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. On one hand, the election of
President Bill Clinton seemingly empowered an advocate for the rights of
gays and lesbians.2 Similar support came from voters in Oregon and Portland,
Maine who rejected referenda aimed at curtailing the rights of homosexuals,
homosexuality itself, or both.' Still, the rights of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals
were detrimentally affected by the passage of voter ballot initiatives in
Tampa, Florida, and the State of Colorado, designed to limit homosexual
rights.4 While both initiatives directly repeal existing ordinances affording
* J.D. Candidate, 1994, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.S., 1988, Indiana
University. Special thanks to my wife, Diane, and my daughter, Alexia, for their constant encourage-
ment.
1. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 27, Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)
(No. 483) (arguing as United States Solicitor General that California's proposition 14, wich repealed
existing laws protecting blacks from racial discrimination in housing, should be struck down as
unconstitutional in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
2. President Clinton has been coined an "advocate of homosexual rights," having captured 72%
of the vote of those individuals identifying themselves as homosexual or bisexual. Jeffrey Schmalz, The
1992 Elections: The States-The Gay Issues; Gay Areas Are Jubilant over Clinton Victory, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 5, 1992, at B8. Many, however, now question President Clinton's commitment to homosexual
rights in light of his recent adoption of the "don't ask, don't tell" policy, which permits homosexuals
to serve in the military only if they do not engage in homosexual conduct and if they remain silent
regarding their sexual preference. Thomas L. Friedman, Gay Rights in the Military: Chiefs Back Clinton
on Gay-Troop Plan: President Admits Revised Policy Isn't Perfect, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1993, at Al.
3. An Oregon proposal sought to amend the state's constitution to officially declare homosexuality
"abnormal, wrong, unnatural and perverse." Allison Carper, Gays Win Some, Lose Some, NEwSDAY,
Nov. 5, 1992, at 29. The Oregon ballot measure failed with a vote of 56% to 44%. Similarly, in
Portland, Maine, voters rejected a ballot initiative to repeal a previously enacted gay-rights ordinance.
Schmalz, supra note 2.
4. Voters in Colorado passed Amendment Two, an initiative amending the state constitution to ban
anti-discrimmation laws aimed at protecting homosexuals while specifically repealing ordinances
currently existing in Aspen, Denver, and Boulder. Meanwhile, voters in Tampa repealed a gay-rights
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protection to homosexuals against discrimination in such areas as housing and
employment, the Colorado amendment goes further and prohibits the adoption
of future ordinances affording anti-bias protection.5
In essence, Colorado's Amendment Two insulates the rights of gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals from the normal political processes in contravention
of the Equal Protection Clause. Amendment Two forces homosexuals and
bisexuals seeking legislative protection against invidious discrimination in
housing and employment, to first amend the Colorado constitution repealing
Amendment Two, and second to pass legislation affording protection-a
nearly impossible task. As such, Amendment Two involves the State of
Colorado in invidious discrimination. In light of a large body of federal case
law prohibiting such actions on the part of the state, Amendment Two violates
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
This Note analyzes the implications of ballot initiatives, such as Colorado's
Amendment Two, and discusses whether such initiatives violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part I of the Note provides
an overview of modem equal protection law concerning the .appropnate
standard of review to be employed for classifications based on sexual
orientation. Part II analyzes ballot initiatives that block access of disfavored
groups, such as homosexuals, from the normal political processes. Part III
assesses the constitutionality of Colorado's Amendment Two in light of the
preceding equal protection analysis.
I. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS-SEXUAL ORIENTATION
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution commands
that "[n]o state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." 6 This directive rings hollow to gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals, who daily suffer patent, invidious discrimination in areas of life
which the balance of society takes for granted.7 Homosexuals remain subject
to the military's anti-gay exclusionary policy, though recently modified to the
"don't ask, don't tell" policy,' they are subject to criminal prosecution for
ordinance. Schmalz, supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. In simplistic terms, this has been construed to mean "that all persons similarly situated should
be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,439 (1985) (citing Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).
7. For a discussion on the need to provide lesbians and gay men with legislative protections, as
analyzed in the context of the constitutional concerns of Colorado Amendment Two, see Note,
Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1905 (1993). The author of that
Note devotes considerable thought to the development of gay rights laws, including an appendix of state
and local gay rights laws currently in force. Although that author addresses equal protection arguments
with respect to Amendment Two similar to those employed in this Note, that author relies more on
empirical data and the unique status of homosexuals than on case law analysis of the status of politicaly
unpopular groups. That author also makes a convincing free expression argument which is, however,
beyond the scope of this Note.
8. Though not governed by the Fourteenth Amendment because the Federal Government is not
deemed a "state" for equal protection purposes, the Supreme Court has nevertheless imposed a similar
obligation on the Federal Government under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause stating that "it
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engaging in consensual adult sexual conduct, 9 and they are denied the right
to marry under state law,'0 which, in essence, leads to the denial of family
rights. 1 Despite this patent and invidious discrimination, gays, lesbians, and
would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal
Government." Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,500 (1954) (footnote omitted). In spite of this, the courts
have often been willing to "defer to the judgment of the military" when reviewing fifth amendment
concerns of military policies employing discriminatory tactics. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (upholding the military's policy of interning American citizens of Japanese
descent stating, "Korematsu was not excluded because of hostility to him or his race. He was
excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire." (emphasis in original)).
One result of the deference afforded to the military has been the adoption of various anti-gay policies.
For various discussions of the military's anti-gay policies, see generally Kurt D. Hermansen, Comment,
Analyzmng the Military's Justifications for its Exclusionary Policy: Ffty Years Without a Rational Basis,
26 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 151 (1992); Troy R. Holroyd, Commentary, Homosexuals and the Military:
Integration or Discrimination?, 8 J. CONTEmp. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 429 (1992); Chad S. Johnson,
Recent Development, A Judicial Blow to the Military's Anti-Gay Policies: Pruitt v. Cheney, 943 F.2d
989 (9th Cir. 1991), 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 244 (1992); John C. Sims, Moving Toward Equal
Treatment of Homosexuals, 23 PAc. L.J. 1543, 1562-73 (1992); Judith H. Stiehm, Gender and Law
Essay and Articles-Managing the Military's Homosexual Exclusion Policy: Text & Subtext, 46 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 685 (1992); and Thomas B. Stoddard, Lesbian and Gay Rights Litigation Before a
Hostile Federal Judiciary: Extracting Benefit From Peril, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 555 (1992).
Although in January 1993, President Clinton reaffirmed his promise to lift the ban on gays serving
in the military, John A. Farrell & Paul Quinn-Judge, Clinton Faces Fight on Military Ban on Gays:
Reaffirms Vow to End Policy, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 1993, at 1, his recent accord with the Pentagon
in adopting the "don't ask, don't tell" policy has been criticized as doing little to end the blatant
discrimination against gays serving m the armed forces. See Joseph P. Shapiro, Facing the Legal Fight
of Their Lives: Gays Take the Military Compromise to Court, U.S. NEws & WORLD REp., Aug. 2, 1993,
at 31. For instance, although homosexuals are permitted to serve in the military under the policy, any
revelation of homosexual orientation creates a rebuttable presumption that the "service member is
engaging in homosexual acts," which could lead to dismissal from the armed forces. Friedman, supra
note 2, at A16. As a result of the adoption of the new policy, the Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund has filed a federal lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the policy on free speech and equal
protection grounds. Shapiro, supra, at 31.
9. Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have statutes that criminalize sodomy. Rone
Sherman, Gay Law No Longer Closeted: Family Issues Face Courts and Lawmakers, NAT'L L. J., Oct.
26, 1992, at 1, 34. In 1986, the Supreme Court delivered a crushing blow to the gay and lesbian
movement by upholding a Georgia sodomy statute, while noting that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not confer a fundamental right on homosexuals to engage in consensual
sodomy between adults. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The Georgia sodomy statute
provides:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act
involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for not
less than one nor more than twenty years.
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (Michle 1992). Though the legislature phrased the statute neutrally, the Court
declared that its decision was based solely on the statute's application to homosexuals. Hardwick, 478
U.S. at 188 n.2.
10. Currently, no state statute permits the marriage of same-sex couples. See Sherman, supra note
9. However, suits challenging the question of same-sex marriages are currently being litigated in Hawaii
and Washington, D.C.. Id. at 1. Recently, in a suit challenging the Hawaii marriage law, the Supreme
Court of Hawaii held that "sex is a 'suspect category' for purposes of equal protection analysis under
article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution." Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993). In so
holding, the court vacated and remanded the lower court's dismissal of the case in order to determine
whether the state had met its burden under strict scrutiny. Id. at 68.
11. Deprivations of family rights have affected gays and lesbians in areas including child custody,
adoption, and surviving partner benefits. Arthur S. Leonard, Report From the Legal Front, NATION, July
2, 1990, at 12, 14-15.
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bisexuals have consistently been denied equal protection of the laws. In fact,
the Supreme Court has expressed its apparent disfavor and discomfort with
homosexuality, stating that it would be "facetious" to conclude that the
Constitution, which extends a "right of privacy" to married couples to use
contraceptives, similarly extends that protection to two adult homosexuals,
engaging in consensual sex in the privacy of their home. 2
A. Tripartite Equal Protection Analysis
Modem equal protection analysis employs a tripartite standard of review
when determining whether a particular public law or policy violates the
protection mandated by the Equal Protection Clause." Depending on the
particular class of persons the law or policy isolates, the courts will review
the law or policy under one of the following standards: "strict scrutiny,"
"intermediate scrutiny," or "rational basis review "14
Rational basis review is the least restrictive of the Court's standards. In
describing rational basis review, the Court has stated that while no exact
formula exists, the "Fourteenth Amendment permits the [s]tates a wide scope
of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently
than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification
rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the [s]tate's
objective."' Thus, under the rational basis standard of review, legislation is
presumed valid and sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is
"rationally related to a legitimate state interest."' 6 Under this standard of
review, the Constitution presumes that even imprudent acts by the legislature
will eventually be remedied by the processes of democracy ,7
The rational basis standard of review, however, is said to "give[]way" when
the classification created by the legislation is based on "race, alienage, or
national origin."' 8 Such classifications are subject to the strict scrutiny
standard of review Often when considering whether a particular classification
calls for heightened scrutiny, that is, scrutiny more stringent than mere
rational basis review, the Court will consider several factors-namely whether
12. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194.
13. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16 (2d ed. 1988).
14. Id.
15. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
16. City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,440 (1985); Schweiker v. Wilson,
450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1980);
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); see also
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973) (stating that governmental regulation will be valid so
long as it "rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose").
17. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. This particular admission by the Court appears to create
confusion when the democratic processes themselves deny certain minorities the use of the democratic
process in rectifying discriminatory legislation, as in the case of Colorado's Amendment Two.
18. Id. Here the Court noted that these classifications are "so seldom relevant to the achievement
of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice
and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others." Id.,
see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (noting that "the Equal Protection Clause demands
that racial classifications be subjected to the 'most rigid scrutiny"' (citation omitted)).
[Vol. 69:275
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the disadvantaged group: 1) has been historically subjected to discrimination;
2) exhibits obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define
them as a discrete group; and 3) is a "minority or [is] politically power-
less."' 9 However, when state laws infringe on fundamental rights guaranteed
by the Constitution, the Court applies strict scrutiny irrespective of the
classification drawn.2" Believing that such legislation will not be rectified by
the democratic processes, the Court will only sustain the legislation if it is
"suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.'
Finally, the Court has carved out certain classifications that are afforded
"quasi-suspect" status and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny Typically, the
classification in these cases provides no sensible ground for disparate
treatment.' Classifications of this type generally include gender23 and
illegitimacy 24 When this level of heightened or intermediate scrutiny is
applicable, the classification will be declared invalid unless it is "substantially
related to a sufficiently important governmental interest. '25
B. Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications
Based On Sexual Orientation in Light of Bowers v Hardwick
Bowers v. Hardwick6 stands as the landmark case to date in the area of
homosexual rights. Importantly, Hardwick was not decided under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather under the
Amendment's Due Process Clause.27 Prior to Hardwick, the Court had carved
out zones of protection from government intrusion, known as "substantive"
due process rights. 28 These are fundamental rights, though not explicitly
19. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986).
20. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing as fundamental certain
constitutionally guaranteed rights to privacy and invalidating a statute prohibiting mramed couples from
using contraceptives).
21. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; see also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
22. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41.
23. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion) (stating that "what
differentiates sex from nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability is that the sex
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society").
24. Illegitimacy has been declared beyond an individual's control and thus bears "no relation to the
individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society." City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441
(quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976)); see also Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99
(1982).
25. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982)); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
26. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
27. Justice White, writing for the majority in Hardwick, made clear that the Court was deciding
"whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy
"Hardwic, 478 U.S. at 190. This distinction is crucial because the Court never addressed whether
homosexuality was to be considered a "suspect" classification for federal equal protection purposes, or
for that matter, whether a law, the effect of which was to discriminate against homosexuals, would have
even passed the rational basis review of equal protection analysis. See infra text accompanying note 32.
28. As the Hardwick majority noted:
It is true that despite the language of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, which appears to focus only on the processes by which life, liberty, or property
19931
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stated in the constitutional text.29 The Hardwick Court nevertheless declined
to extend the right of privacy to homosexuals engaging in acts of consensual
sodomy 3 This decision, however, has not gone without some cogent
criticism.3
Some commentators have suggested that the decision in Hardwick, though
failing to find a constitutional right to engage in homosexual sodomy under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, left open the
possibility of a challenge on equal protection grounds.32 Often a distinction
has been drawn between homosexual "orientation" or status and homosexual
"conduct." Several lower federal court decisions, while failing to decide
whether homosexual orientation is "suspect" when considering the appropriate
standard of review, have, in a sense, drawn a line of demarcation indicating
that homosexual "conduct" is not a suspect classification. These decisions
apparently leave the door open to grant orientation "suspect" status in the
future, or perhaps merely acknowledge that the Supreme Court's decision in
Hardwick applied only to homosexual conduct (for instance, acts of sod-
omy).33 This distinction between "status" and "conduct" draws further
is taken, the cases are legion in which those Clauses have been interpreted to have substantive
content, subsuming rights that to a great extent are immune from federal or state regulation or
proscnption. Among such cases are those recognizing rights that have little or no textual
support in the constitutional language.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191.
29. See generally Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (recognizing the right to
decide whether to procreate via use of contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing
the right to abort pregnancy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing the right to
use contraceptives); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (recognizing the right to procreate);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (recognizing the right to instruct one's child in foreign
languages).
30. Hardwick 478 U.S. at 192.
31. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 13 §§ 15-21; Sims, supra note 8, at 1549-56; Norman Vieira,
Hardwick and the Right of Privacy, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1181 (1988) (criticizing the procedure ignored
in Hardwick).
Recently, the decision in Hardwick has been questioned by the same Justice who cast the deciding
vote in the five to four opinion. Retired Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., acknowledged that he probably
made a mistake in voting with the majority in the Hardwick decision, indicating that the right of privacy
should have been extended in that case. Linda Greenhouse, ,hen Second Thoughts in Case Come Too
Late, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 5, 1990, at A14.
32. See Cass R. Sunstem, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1988). Professor Sunstem makes
a persuasive argument that the Due Process Clause has typically been interpreted to protect traditional
practices against current departures, while the Equal Protection Clause, working m contrast to the Due
Process Clause, seeks to protect disadvantaged groups from discriminatory practices, even though such
discrimination is firmly rooted in tradition. Id. at 1162 n.9. Hardwick can be further distinguished when
the discrimination alleged is on the basis of homosexual status (orientation) rather than on homosexual
conduct. Id. at 1165 n.9. Thus, Professor Sunstem concludes that courts may afford relief to victims of
discrimination on equal protection grounds without contradicting Hardwick. But see Sims, supra note
8, at 1569 (asserting that Professor Sunstem's argument regarding the separation between due process
and equal protection analysis fails in the end because the Hardwick Court "derailed the equal protection
analysis which would have led to the application of heightened scrutiny to classifications based on
sexual orientation").
33. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.
1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987); National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ.,
729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), affrd by equally divided Court, 470 U.S. 903 (1985); Singer v. United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977).
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credence from the Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v. California,34
which struck down a statute making the status of narcotic addiction a criminal
offense-even absent proof of possession, purchase, sale, or actual use-as
violative of the Eighth Amendment.35 Moreover, several recent court
decisions have asserted that homosexual "orientation" is a classification
demanding heightened scrutiny for equal protection purposes, noting that
Hardwick was not dispositive of the issue.
For instance, the Ninth Circuit in Watkins v. U.S. Army,36 stated that
homosexuality is a classification subject to heightened judicial scrutiny for
federal equal protection purposes. 37 In Watkins, the U.S. Army discharged
Watkins, pursuant to a 1981 Army regulation mandating the discharge of all
homosexuals, based on a prior admission of his homosexual orientation.38
The court noted that "nothing in Hardwick suggests that the state may
penalize gays for their sexual orientation. '39 Furthermore, the Watkins court
noted that it cannot "read Hardwick as standing for the proposition that
government may outlaw sodomy only when committed by a disfavored class
of persons."4 The court reiterated that the Equal Protection Clause com-
mands "evenhandedness," the role of which is defined in "perfecting, rather
than frustrating, the democratic process.
41
Similarly, in 1991, a Kansas federal district court issued its opinion in Jantz
v. MuCe. 42 In Jantz, the plaintiff sought a teaching position in a public school
but was denied the position based on the principal's perception that the
applicant had "homosexual tendencies. 43 The Jantz court found that "a
governmental classification based on an individual's sexual orientation is
inherently suspect"' and denied the defendant-principal's motion for
summary judgment on the equal protection claim.45 In so finding, the court
34. Robinson, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
35. Id. at 665-66.
36. Watkins, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), opinions withdrawn and plainfiff's claim upheld on
other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (1989) (en bane), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990). The Ninth Circuit,
sitting en bane for rehearing, later applied the doctrine of estoppel, avoiding having to decide the equal
protection Issue. The court held that the Army was equitably estopped from refusing to reenlist Watkins
on the basis of Ins status as a homosexual because the Army had overlooked his homosexuality in the
past. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (1989) (en bane), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
37. Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1349, 1352.
38. Id. at 1330-32.
39. Id. at 1340. Here the court drew an analogy to Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962),
which held that even though the state could criminalize the use of narcotics, criminalizmg the status of
narcotic addition alone would be in violation of the Due Process Clause.
40. Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1340.
41. Id. at 1341. The court further noted that the driving force behind Hardwick "is the Court's
ongoing concern with the expansion ofnghts under substantive due process, not an unbounded antipathy
toward a disfavored group." Id. at 1342.
42. Jantz, 759 F. Supp. 1543 (D. Kan. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2445 (1993). The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court granting
summary judgment for the defendant-prncipal on the grounds of qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit,
while acknowledging the split over the effect of Hardwick, noted that it "need not decide how Hardwick
affects equal protection claims." Jantz, 976 F.2d at 629.
43. Jantz, 759 F. Supp. at 1543.
44. Id. at 1554.
45. Id. at 1551.
1993]
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stated that the defendant's reliance on Hardwick was not relevant as Hardwick
addressed only whether the Georgia sodomy statute violated due process, not
equal protection.46
Finally, in the recent California superior court case of Citizens for
Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court,47 the court invoked the Equal
Protection Clauses of both the federal and California constitutions in
upholding the City of Riverside's refusal to place an initiative on the ballot
that in part repealed city ordinances barring discrimination based on sexual
orientation or AIDS affliction. In Citizens, the court noted that although the
Supreme Court in Hardwick upheld the crimmalization of homosexual sodomy
as not protected as a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause, that
holding never implied that homosexuals were not entitled to equal protection
of the laws.48 Here, however, the court stopped short of deeming homosexu-
ality a suspect class for equal protection purposes, finding "the proposed
ordinance invalid even under the less stringent 'rational basis' test.
49
Not all courts have accepted the argument that Hardwick left open the
possibility for an equal protection challenge to classifications based on sexual
orientation. In fact, some courts have considered Hardwick dispositive of the
equal protection issue, have denied heightened scrutiny to classifications based
on sexual orientation on other grounds, or both. For example, in 1989, the
Seventh Circuit issued its opinion in Ben-Shalom v. Marsh,5" where the
plaintiff, an Army Reserve sergeant, had challenged an Army regulation that
barred her reenlistment on grounds that she was an admitted homosexual.-"
The district court sustained the plaintiffs challenge on grounds that the
regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause as the regulation applied only
to homosexual conduct and no evidence existed that the plaintiff had engaged
in the same.52 The Seventh Circuit, however, reversed, stating that as a result
of Hardwick, "[i]f homosexual conduct may be constitutionally criminalized,
then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled
to greater than rational basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes.""3 The
46. Id. at 1546. The court in fact employed the Hardwick decision and the reasoning therein to
bolster the argument in favor of heightened scrutiny, stating:
It is perfectly consistent to say that homosexual sodomy is not a practice so deeply rooted in
our traditions as to merit due process protection, and at the same time to say, for example, that
because homosexuals have historically been subject to invidious discrimination, laws which
burden homosexuals as a class should be subject to heightened scrutiny under the equal
protection clause. Indeed, the two propositions may be considered complementary: In all
probability, homosexuality is not considered a deeply-rooted part of our traditions precisely
because homosexuals have historically been subjected to invidious discrimination.
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 719 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Noms, J., concurring)).
47. Citizens for Responsible Behavior, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
48. Id. at 654.
49. Id. at 655. For further discussion of the court's application of rational basis review to a fact
situation remarkably similar to Colorado's Amendment Two, see infra parts I.C, II.B, and III.
50. Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
51. Id. at 456-57.
52. Id. at 463-64.
53. Id. at 464.
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Seventh Circuit refused to acknowledge the distinction between orientation
and conduct in noting that "[b]y admitting to being a lesbian, plaintiff admits
to what the regulation prohibts. 5 4 The Ben-Shalom court then held that the
Army's policy of discharging admitted homosexuals "clearly promotes a
legitimate government interest sufficient to survive rational basis scrutiny ""
Likewise, in High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance
Office,56 the Ninth Circuit stated that "if there is no fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy [as noted in Hardwick] it would be
incongruous to expand the reach of equal protection to find a fundamental
right of homosexual conduct under the equal protection component of the
Fifth Amendment." 57 In High Tech Gays, the plaintiffs, a class of gay and
lesbian applicants for employment positions requiring top secret security
clearances by the Defense Department, challenged the Department's expanded
investigation for clearances of gay and lesbian applicants. 5 The court
rejected the idea that homosexuality could be deemed a suspect or quasi-
suspect class, asserting that even though homosexuals have a long history of
discrimination, the characteristic of homosexuality is not immutable,59 nor
are homosexuals without political power. 6' The court then applied the
rational basis standard, granting "[s]pecial deference" to the Defense
Department's opinion that homosexuals are "vulnerable to hostile intelligence
efforts," and upheld the policy 61
54. Id. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that, in being an admitted lesbian, the plaintiffimust therefore
also "'desire[] bodily contact between persons of the same sex. with the intent of obtaining or giving
sexual gratification."' Id. (quoting the applicable Army Regulation, AR 140-111, Table 4-2).
55. Id. at 465. The court noted that the "particular classification is supported by military
considerations and should be left to the Army." Id. The position represents the traditional "deference
to military decisions" the courts have traditionally employed when evaluating military policies that
patently discriminate against certain classes of people. See supra note 8; see also discussion infra part
I.C.
56. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d
1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("After Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against
homosexuals is constitutionally infirm.").
57. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 571 (citations omitted). The court found no distinction between
orientation and conduct.
58. Id. at 565-66.
59. Id. at 573. The court specifically noted that homosexuality is "behavioral and hence
fundamentally different from traits such as race, gender, or alienage, which define already existing
suspect and quasi-suspect classifications." Id., accord Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076
(Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[H]omosexuality is primarily behavioral in character."). But see Jantz v. Muci, 759
F. Supp. 1543, 1547 n.3 (D. Kan. 1991) (recognizing that neither High Tech Gays nor Woodward
offered "the slightest support or authority for the position that homosexuality is a mutable characteris-
tic").
60. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574. Homosexuals "have the ability to and do 'attract the attention
of the law makers,' as evidenced by such legislation." Id. (quoting City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985)). In so stating, the court cited several states and municipalities that
had enacted anti-discrimination legislation protecting homosexuals. Id. at n.10; see also Ben-Shalom v.
Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 466 n.9 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that "[h]omosexuals are not without political
power," and basing this conclusion in part on a magazine report that "one congressman is an avowed
homosexual" (emphasis added)); Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1991) (stating that
"homosexuals as a class enjoy a good deal of political power m our society").
61. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 577.
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Each of these conclusions, however, is far from uncontroverted.62
Colorado's amending of its constitution to effectively deny homosexuals
access to the political process raises grave concerns regarding the denial of
heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation. Moreover,
the apparent trend in moving the anti-homosexual campaign to the ballot
box63 enhances the argument that homosexuals are politically powerless.
Thus, heightened scrutiny should be applied to classifications based on sexual
orientation.
C. Invocation of the "Active" Rational Basis Review
While some courts are apparently reluctant to grant homosexuality "suspect"
or "quasi-suspect" status, other courts are beginning to apply a type of
"active" rational basis test. For instance, in Pruitt v. Cheney,64 the Ninth
Circuit reversed and remanded the lower court's dismissal of an Army
Reserve officer's equal protection challenge of an Army regulation mandating
her discharge because she had acknowledged that she was homosexual.65 The
court indicated that even though classifications based on sexual orientation
were subject to rational basis review, City of Cleburne demands a review of
the regulation "to see whether the government had established on the record
a rational basis for the challenged discrimination." 66 Thus, the court required
an examination of the factual record to ensure the existence of a rational basis
before dismissal could be granted.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Heller v. Doe,67 however, may
have undermined the "active" rational basis test employed by the Court in
City of Cleburne. In Heller, the Court upheld the distinctions drawn between
mental illness and mental retardation in Kentucky's involuntary commitment
proceedings statute as satisfying the rational basis test.68 In so holding, the
62. It should be noted that the Supreme Court, as pointed out in Jantz, 759 F. Supp. at 1548 n.5,
has on several occasions omitted reference to "immutability" as a requirement for heightened scrutiny.
See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 313 (1976); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
For a discussion of the influences of prejudice in the equal protection debate, see John C. Hayes,
Note, The Tradition of Prejudice Versus the Principle of Equality: Homosexuals and Heightened Equal
Protection Scrutiny After Bowers v. Hardwick, 31 B.C.L. REv. 375 (1990). For a model theory of
including homosexuality in the boundary of suspectness, see Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual
Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1285 (1985).
63. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
64. Pruitt, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 655 (1992).
65. Id. at 1167.
66. Id. at 1166 (emphasis in original); see also United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973) (noting that "if the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.") (emphasis in original).
67. Heller, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993).
68. Id. at 2647. In particular, the Kentucky statutory procedures for the commitment of the mentally
ill versus the mentally retarded differ in two significant respects: 1) the applicable burden of proof in
the mental illness proceeding is beyond a reasonable doubt whereas the standard m mental retardation
proceedings is clear and convincing evidence; and 2) guardians and immediate family members of the
subject of a mental retardation proceeding may participate as if parties to the proceeding. Id. at 2640.
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Court in Heller made reference to City of Cleburne only once,"' paying scant
attention to the Cleburne Court's inquiry into the "record" to determine
whether it reveals a rational relation to a legitimate government interest.
70
Rather, the Heller Court stated that "[a] State has no obligation to
produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification. '[A]
legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on
rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.'" 7 ' This
statement by the Court, however, appears aimed at defining the burdens of the
respective parties because the Heller Court made extensive use of the record
offered by Kentucky in determining that the distinction met the rational basis
test.
72
Most recently, though, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
California applied the rational basis test as stated in Heller to strike down the
military's policy of excluding homosexuals as violative of the Fifth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause. In Dahl v. Secretary of the United States
Navy,73 the Navy discharged Dahl pursuant to its homosexual exclusion
policy after Dahl had disclosed in an official interview that he was homosexu-
al. The discharge came despite evidence of Dahl's "excellent service record
and affidavits of support from [his] shipmates and superiors."74 In addressing
the Heller decision in the context of the proper standard for rational basis
review, the Dahl court stated, "After Heller there can be no question that
the burden is on the person challenging the policy to negate every conceivable
rational basis for the legislative justification."'75 The court proceeded to
observe that Heller did not disturb the notion that "a court must examine the
record to determine whether the policymaker's proffered justifications for its
policy are based on impermissible prejudice.
In applying rational basis scrutiny to the Navy's homosexual exclusion
policy, the court granted Dahl's motion for summary judgment and reinstated
him in the Navy The Dahl court declared the policy unconstitutional, as the
69. Id. at 2643. In fact, Justice Souter, m indicating that he would have struck down the disparity
of treatment drawn by the Kentucky statute as not satisfying the rational basis test employed in City of
Cleburne, stated, "While the Court cites Cleburne once, and does not purport to overrule it, neither does
the Court apply it, and at the end of the day Cleburne's status is left uncertain." Id. at 2652 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
70. City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) ("Because in our view
the record does not reveal any rational basis for believing that the Featherston home [for the mentally
retarded] would pose any special threat to the city's legitimate interests, we affirm the judgment below
insofar as it holds the ordinance invalid as applied in this case.).
71. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2643 (citing FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2098(1993)).
72. See generally id. at 2643-48.
73. Dahl, No. CIV.S.89-0351 MLS, 1993 WL 328364, at *1 (E.D. Cal., Aug. 30, 1993). Dahl
addresses the constitutionality of the Navy's homosexual exclusion policy intact at the time of Dahl's
discharge in 1981. This decision does not address the recently adopted "don't ask, don't tell" policy.
74. Id. Dahl, however, denied having engaged in homosexual conduct subsequent to enlisting in the
Navy. Id.
75. Id. at *6. The court, however, indicated that this burden had always been present under rational
basis review. Id. at *20 n.10.
76. Id. at *7 (emphasizing that "[tihe court in Heller made clear that the rational basis standard
enunciated in that case was the same standard used in Clebume").
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Navy's justifications for the policy were either facially prejudicial or lacked
any inference of legitimate basis in fact and were therefore based on
prejudice.77 In particular, the court found no legitimate basis for the policy,
especially in light of the fact that the bulk of the Navy's proffered bases for
the exclusionary policy undermined the policy itself. For instance, the court
noted that the Navy's own studies of homosexuals in the military often
produced evidence that the homosexual military personnel were equally, if not
more, qualified personnel than their heterosexual counterparts. 78 In conclud-
ing, the court stated, "In sum, [the Navy's] rationales for the homosexual
exclusion and the evidence offered in support of those rationales supports,
rather than undermines, [Dahl's] argument and evidence that the exclusion
policy is not based on any legitimate government interest.
79
The active rational basis review has also recently been employed by the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California in issuing its opinion
in the case of Meinhold v United States Department of Defense.0 This
decision came after the court had preliminarily enjoined the Department of
Defense from discharging Meinhold, an acknowledged homosexual, and
ordering the reinstatement of Meinhold until the case could be heard on the
merits of the discharge."' The Navy had discharged Meinhold after twelve
years of service following Meinhold's admission on a "national news
program" that he was gay 82 Meinhold's discharge came despite his rating
in the "top ten percent of all Navy instructors," despite the Navy's own
admission that Meinhold was "one of its very best airborne sonar analysts and
instructors," 3 and despite the fact that members of his naval unit knew of
his sexual orientation prior to his appearance on television. 4
In the trial on the merits, the court applied rational basis review in ruling
that the Defense Department "is permanently enjoined from discharging or
denying enlistment to any person based on sexual orientation in the absence
of sexual conduct which interferes with the military mission of the armed
forces of the United States." 5 In so doing, the court declared that the
military lacked a rational basis-that the justifications put forward by the
military were "based on cultural myths and false stereotypes" and were "very
similar to the reasons offered to keep the military racially segregated in the
1940s. '"6 While it is unclear how sweeping the effect of MeInhold will be,
the facts in Meinhold seemingly run afoul of the recently adopted "don't ask,
77. Id. at *13.
78. Id. at * 13-14 (stating that, for instance, homosexuals demonstrate lower levels of sexual interest
than heterosexuals and pose no more security risks than heterosexuals).
79. Id. at *17.
80. Meinhold, 808 F Supp. 1453, 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1993).








don't tell" policy. 7 Although the decision may accordingly lose its impor-
tance in the military context, it nonetheless provides a road map for the
performance of the rational basis test in other areas of state discrimination
against homosexuals.
The Dahl and Meinhold decisions are especially impressive because the
courts found equal protection violations under a rational basis analysis despite
the traditional deference afforded to the military " Thus, when the govern-
ment is not sheltered by "deference to the military," as in Dahl and Meinhold,
the "active" rational basis test should be even more stringent. 9 While these
cases are at most persuasive in terms of their command of the "law of the
land," it would be premature to presume that the Supreme Court is ready to
employ an "active" rational basis review to classifications based on sexual
orientation. Furthermore, the Court's employment of "active" rational basis
review may have been foreclosed by the decision in Heller 90 Yet, regardless
of the force of these decisions today, the enactment of laws affirmatively
denying classes of people access to the political process raises different and
more complex equal protection concerns.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION AND STATE ACTIONS 91
INSULATING DISFAVORED GROUPS FROM THE
NORMAL POLITICAL PROCESS
Professor Laurence Tribe has noted that the arm of equal protection
extending from the Fourteenth Amendment has essentially two axes of
application: 92 a horizontal axis, which mandates equality in state action in
all branches of government,93 and a vertical axis, which governs the method
87. The Justice Department has recently filed a brief, in the wake of the adoption of the "don't ask,
don't tell" policy, appealing the Meinhold decision. The Government is arguing that the doctrine of
separation of powers "requires the courts 'to defer to the political branches and permit them to make
their own determination of the appropriate policy concerning homosexuals in the military."' U.S.
Files Response on Moffett Sailor, S.F. CHRON., July 31, 1993, at A7.
88. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-68 (1981); see also supra note 8. This is similar
to the reasoning employed in Pruitt, stating that the Army's policy "should not be held to be rational
as a matter of law." Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1166 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 655
(1992).
89. For an interesting discussion on the effect of the Pruitt decision, see Johnson, supra note 8.
90. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
91. While the concept of "state action" is normally a complex prerequisite to the establishment of
a claim alleging violations under the Fourteenth Amendment, actions taken by a state in the form of a
state constitutional amendment, commanding the force of state law, meet this requirement with relative
ease. See TRIBE, supra note 13 § 18-3 (citing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), for the relative
ease with wich the state action element was satisfied, noting that in Reitman, "the state constitutional
amendment at issue in that case discriminated against minority groups who sought the protection of fair
housing legislation since, to achieve their goal, these groups would have to obtain repeal of the
amendment, and then proceed through the legislative process, while groups seeking other legislation
needed only to resort to the state legislature" (footnote omitted)).
92. See TRIBE, supra note 13 §§ 16-17.
93. Id. Professor Tribe notes that examples of the equal protection analysis on the horizontal axis
have been applied to discriminatory legislation as well as discriminatory executive, administrative, and
judicial behavior. Id. Moreover, such analysis has been applied on the basis of whether the
discrimination was invidious or couched in facially neutral language. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
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by which decision-making power may be allocated along the governmental
hierarchy 94 Along the vertical axis, the Supreme Court has acted to remedy
laws which prejudice certain classes in society while disguised as "instances
of democratic redistributions of authority "
The majority of cases in this area tend to fall under strict scrutiny as most
actions of this type historically have related to redistributions of authority
based on race. 96 There is a competing view that strict scrutiny has been
applied in these cases because the right to participate in the democratic
process is a "fundamental right." This Part of the Note first addresses cases
providing the framework when the majority unilaterally strips the affected
minority of the right to the normal democratic processes. Next, this Part
discusses the concerns as applied under rational basis review
A. Heightened Scrutiny
Perhaps the leading case in the area of applying heightened scrutiny to state
actions that deprive affected minorities of their voice in the political process
is the Supreme Court's decision in Reitman v. Mulkey 9' In Reitman, the
Court invalidated California's proposition fourteen ballot initiative, which
passed by popular vote in a statewide election, and amended the California
Constitution to prohibit the State or any of its agencies from denying the right
of people to sell their real property to any person they choose. 9 Not only
did the amendment specifically forestall future state action which might carve
out protection for those suffering from invidious discrimination in housing,
but it overturned existing state laws that restricted a seller's right to
discriminate in the housing market.99 In affirming the California Supreme
Court's invalidation of proposition fourteen, the Reitman Court adopted the
I18 U.S. 356 (1886) (concluding that the effect of an ordinance that prohibited the construction of
wooded laundries without a license, though facially neutral, denied all Chinese applicants licenses to
construct laundry facilities).
94. See TRIBE, supra note 13 §§ 16-17.
95. Id.
96. For a discussion of heightened scrutiny applicable to race, see generally supra part I.A.
97. Reitman, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). For a detailed analysis of Reitman, see Charles L. Black, The
Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Forward: "State Action, " Equal Protection, and California's Proposition
14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69 (1967).
98. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 370-71. The pertinent part of the text of the ballot initiative provided as
follows:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge, directly
or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part
or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or
persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.
Id. at 371.
99. Id. at 374 (citing the conclusions of the California Supreme Court in Mulkey v. Reitman, 413
P.2d 825, 829 (Cal. 1966), which initially struck down the amendment as violative of the equal
protection clause). Specifically, proposition 14 was designed to repeal the effect of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which prohibited racial discrimination by business establishments (and encompassed the
activities of real estate brokers and any business selling or leasing real estate), and the Rumford Fair
Housing Act, which prohibited racial discrimination in the sale or rental of private dwellings containing
more than four units. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 374.
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lower court's conclusion that it established "'a purported constitutional right
to privately discriminate on grounds which admittedly would be unavailable
under the Fourteenth Amendment should state action be involved." 00
Although the Court acknowledged that the State could remain neutral with
respect to private racial discrimination, it pointed out that significant
involvement by the State in private racial discrimination could render the state
action unconstitutional.' 1 In so doing, the Court accepted the California
Supreme Court's conclusion that "the State had taken affirmative action
designed to make private discriminations legally possible."' 0 2 The Reitman
Court was careful to limit its holding by expressing that it was not precluding
a state from placing in statutory form a policy which expresses neutrality with
regard to private discriminations. 0 3 It noted that the California court "quite
properly undertook to examine the constitutionality of [proposition fourteen]
in terms of its 'immediate objective,' its 'ultimate effect' and its 'historical
context and the conditions existing prior to enactment.""1
0 4
The Court's reasoning in Reitman was similarly expressed in Hunter v.
Erickson,"' where the Court again struck down legislation blocking
minorities from access to the normal political process. In Hunter, the Court
declared that a "[s]tate may no more disadvantage any particular group by
making it more difficult to enact legislation on its behalf than it may dilute
any person's vote or give any group a smaller representation than another of
comparable size."10 6 The Hunter Court found unconstitutional a city charter
amendment which had been approved by referendum. The amendment
provided that the City Council of Akron, Ohio, could pass no ordinance
affording relief from discrimination in housing based on race, color, religion,
national origin, or ancestry, without approval by the majority of the ballots
100. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 374 (emphasis in original).
101. Id. at 374-75 (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)). In Burton, the
Court found state action and a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
where a publicly owned automobile garage refused to serve a patron solely on the basis of his race.
Burton, 365 U.S. at 716. The Court further declared that "pnvate conduct abridging individual rights
does no violence to the Equal Protection Clause unless to some significant extent the State in any of
its manifestations has been found to have become involved in it." Id. at 722. See also Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that state court enforcement of private racially restrictive
covenants amounts to state action and therefore denies equal protection of the laws).
102. Reitian, 387 U.S. at 375. In Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825, 834 (Cal. 1966), aft d, 387 U.S.
369 (1967), the California Supreme Court stated that:
[T]he state, recognizing that it could not perform a direct act of discrimination, nevertheless
has taken affirmative action of a legislative nature designed to make possible private
discriminatory practices which previously were legally restricted. We cannot realistically
conclude that, because the final act of discrimination is undertaken by a private party motivated
only by personal economic or social considerations, we must close our eyes and ears to the
events which purport to make the final act legally possible. Here the state has affirmatively
acted to change its existing laws from a situation wherein the discrimination practiced was
legally restricted to one wherein it was encouraged
103. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 376.
104. Id. at 373.
105. Hunter, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
106. Id. at 393 (citation omitted).
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cast in the city '07 The Court reasoned that although the law was facially
neutral, "the reality is that the law's impact falls on the minority "'s
Accordingly, the amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause because the
disparate impact was a product of unjustified and official distinctions based
on race, a suspect classification." 9 Thus, the Court held that the amendment
to the city charter "discriminates against minorities, and constitutes a real,
substantial, and invidious denial of the equal protection of the laws.""0
The Court extended Reitman in Washington v. Seattle School District No.
1,11 where the Court cogently expressed the disproportionate burdens placed
on minorities in the wake of legislation isolating them from the democratic
process. In Seattle School District, a local school district challenged the
constitutionality of a statewide ballot proposal, initiative 350, designed to
prohibit school boards from requiring students to attend schools other than
one geographically near the student's residence." 2 Here, the Court struck
down the ballot initiative as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause "because [initiative 350] does 'not attemp[t] to allocate
governmental power on the basis of any general principle.""' 3 The Seattle
School District Court further noted that initiative 350 "imposes direct and
undeniable burdens on minority interest. 'If a governmental institution is to
be fair, one group cannot always be expected to win,' by the same token, one
group cannot be subjected to a debilitating and often insurmountable
disadvantage.""' 4 Finally, the Court dismissed the notion that Hunter had
been effectively overruled by Washington v. Davis"5 and its progeny,"6
which stand for the proposition that "[t]he central purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on




The Seattle School District Court acknowledged that when facially-neutral
legislation is the subject of an equal protection attack, Davis mandates an
inquiry into the intent of the legislation to determine whether it was designed
to produce a disparate impact on a racial minority ,1' "But when the
political process or the decisionmaking mechanism used to address racially
conscious legislation-and only such legislation-is singled out for peculiar
107. Id. at 386.
108. Id. at 391. The Court noted that "[the majority needs no protection against discrimination and
if it did, a referendum might be bothersome but no more than that." Id.
109. Id. at 391-93.
i10. Id. at 393. In dicta, the Court further noted that "a State may distribute legislative power as it
desires and that the people may retain for themselves the power over certain subjects but these
principles furnish nojustification for a legislative structure which otherwise would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 392.
111. Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
112. Id. at 462.
113. Id. at 470 (quoting Justice Harlan's concurrence in Hunter, 393 U.S. at 395).
114. Id. at 483-84 (quoting Justice Harlan's concurrence in Hunter, 393 U.S. at 394).
115. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
116. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
117. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239.
118. Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. at 484-85.
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and disadvantageous treatment, the government action plainly 'rests on
distinctions based on race......9
The legacy of Reitman, Hunter, and Seattle School District appears
dispositive, at least in terms of invalidating voter ballot initiatives that seek
the repeal of legislation designed to afford disparate impact relief to racial
minorities. 20 These situations produce clear calls for strict scrutiny,
especially due to the Court's sensitivity to disparate impact classifications
based on race. Yet another interpretation of the holdings in these decisions is
founded on the view that the right to participate in the democratic process is
a fundamental right, demanding application of a strict scrutiny standard of
review irrespective of the classification drawn.1
2
'
The view that the right to participate in the democratic process is a
fundamental right was implicitly acknowledged in the Supreme Court's
decision in Gordon v. Lance. 2 2 In Gordon, the Court expanded its holding
in Hunter by indicating that the heightened scrutiny applied in Hunter was not
based solely on racial discrimination. Gordon involved the constitutionality
of a West Virginia statute prohibiting political subdivisions of the State from
incurring bonded indebtedness without the approval of sixty percent of the
voters in a referendum election. 23 The sixty percent vote requirement was
challenged as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. 24 The Gordon Court
held that the statute did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 25 In so
holding, the Court declared the voting requirement applied equally "to all
bond issues for any purpose, whether for schools, sewers, or highways," and
thus did not implicate the concerns expressed in Hunter.26 In distinguishing
Hunter, where the class singled out "was clear-those who would benefit from
laws barring racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations,"' 27 the Gordon
Court found no similarly identifiable class. 28 In contrast to Hunter, the
Court in Gordon stated, "we can discern no independently identifiable group
or category that favors bonded indebtedness over other forms of financing.
119. Id. at 485 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,
433 (1984) ("Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect.").
Seattle School District is distinguishable from its companion case, Crawford v. Board of Education
of L.A., 458 U.S. 527 (1982). In Crawford, California voters ratified proposition one, which prohibited
California state courts from ordering desegregation busing remedies "except to remedy a specific
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment and unless a federal court
would be permitted under federal decisional law to impose [a remedy]." Id. at 532. The Crawford
Court concluded that, unlike initiative 350 in Seattle School District, proposition one did not constitute
an impermissible shift in political structure but rather a permissible change in substantive legal rights.
Id. at 540. For a criticism of Crawford, see TRIBE, supra note 13, §§ 16-17.
120. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
121. For a discussion of heightened scrutiny applicable to fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution, see generally supra part I.A.
122. Gordon, 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
123. Id. at 2.
124.Id.
125. Id. at4.
126. Id. at 5.
127. Hunter v. Erickson, 293 U.S. 385, 391 (1969).
128. Gordon, 403 U.S. at 5.
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Consequently, no sector of the population may be said to be 'fenced out' from
the franchise because of the way they will vote."'1 29 Accordingly, the Court
acknowledged that when an independently "identifiable group," as opposed to
a "suspect classification," is "fenced out" from the franchise, the heightened
scrutiny as applied in Hunter is implicated.
The language in Gordon has prompted at least one court to suggest that
Hunter is to be afforded broad application beyond that of pure racial
discrimination. This interpretation was recently put forth by the Colorado
Supreme Court in Evans v Romer, 30 where the court upheld the trial
court's granting of a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of
Amendment Two pending a trial on the merits. The Colorado Supreme Court
supported the broad application of Hunter, as interpreted in Gordon, on two
grounds. First, the Gordon Court felt compelled to compare and contrast
Hunter beyond a cursory dismissal that Hunter involved impermissible
classifications based on race whereas Gordon did not.' 3 ' And second, the
Gordon Court limited the dissimilarity of Hunter to the absence of a group of
voters that was "'independently identifiable' apart from the group created by
the statute itself."'132 Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court in Evans concluded
that the "Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution protects
the fundamental right to participate equally in the political process, and that
any legislation or state constitutional amendment which infringes on this right
by 'fencing out' an independently identifiable class of persons must be subject
to strict judicial scrutiny "133
Although the Evans court thought the Gordon interpretation of Hunter
expanded the arena of fundamental rights, mandating strict scrutiny, it had
greater difficulty distinguishing the Supreme Court's decision in- James v.
Valtierra.134 In James, the Court declined to extend Hunter to invalidate a
California constitutional amendment that required majority approval in a
community election for any construction of low-rent housing, as the
amendment was not "aimed at a racial minority ""' The Evans court
concluded that James "is best understood as a case declining to apply suspect
status to the poor, and not as a limitation of Hunter "6 This conclusion,
however, appears to underscore the Hunter Court's reliance on the classifica-
tion being "suspect" rather than merely identifiable because the poor are
certainly an independently identifiable class of persons.
Yet, in the end, the court in Evans makes a convincing argument that the
real directive in Reitman, Hunter, and their progeny lies not in a constitutional
disfavor cast upon classifications based on race, but rather in a fundamental
129. Id.
130. Evans, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993).
131. Id. at 1282.
132. Id.
133. Id. (footnote omitted).
134. James, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
135. Id. at 141.
136. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1282 n.21.
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right to participate equally in the democratic process.' 3' The Evans court
was quick to point out that had Reitman, Hunter, Seattle School District, and
Gordon merely represented "race cases," "the Supreme Court would have been
required to do nothing more than note that the legislation at issue drew a
classification that was inherently suspect . and apply strict scrutiny to
resolve those cases."'38 Rather, in each case, the Court consistently
reiterated "the paramount importance of political participation." 39
As the above analysis indicates, strong arguments abound for subjecting to
strict scrutiny state actions that insulate disfavored groups from access to the
normal political process. Although the Supreme Court has not addressed this
proposition in the context of classifications based on sexual orientation, prior
Court decisions lead logically to the conclusion that the impingement upon a
fundamental right to participate equally in the political process implicates
strict scrutiny regardless of whether the Court considers homosexuality a
suspect classification.
B. Rational Basis Review
Notwithstanding the argument pertaining to a fundamental right to
participate in the democratic process and despite the obvious distinction
between the issues of race and sexual preference, Reitman and its progeny
similarly provide insight as to how to approach Colorado's Amendment Two
under rational basis review For example, a recent California Court of Appeal
decision has applied the law as stated in Reitman, Hunter, and Seattle School
District to a case remarkably similar to that presented by Colorado's
Amendment Two. 40 In Citizens for Responsible Behavior ("Citizens'), the
court upheld the City of Riverside's refusal to place an initiative on the local
ballot.'4 ' The proposed voter initiative sought, in part, to repeal "existing
ordinances evidencing the City's concern for discrimination against homosexu-
als and those infected with the HIV virus, and which require[d] any future
ordinances prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or
AIDS to be submitted to the voters for approval."' 42
137. Id. at 1282.
138. Id. at 1283.
139. Id. at 1278.
140. Citizens, 1 Cal. App. 4th 1013 (Cal. Rptr. 2d. 1991).
141. Id. at 1019.
142. Id. at 1026. The court set forth the primary provisions of the initiative as follows,
1) Homosexuality and bisexuality have never been recognized as fundamental human rights by
the United States Supreme Court, and the City does not so recognize them.
2) AIDS and its related medical conditions are national and statewide problems and should not
be addressed by the City.
3) City shall not enact any policy or law which "defines homosexuality, bisexuality, sexual
orientation, affectional preference, or gay or lesbian conduct as a fundamental human right",
"Classifies AIDS or homosexuality as the basis for determining an unlawful discriminatory
practice and/or establishes a penalty or civil remedy therefor", "provides preferential treatment
or affirmative action on the basis of sexual orientation or AIDS", or "promotes, encourages,
endorses, legitimizes orjustifies homosexuality."
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The court in Citizens, though quick to point out that Hunter was a "strict
scrutiny" case, made it clear that the proposed ordinance would be invalid
even under the less stringent "rational basis" test. 43 The court stated two
reasons for its conclusion. First, in Hunter, the Court rejected the defendants'
arguments with relative ease. 44 And second, no "rational basis justifie[d]
the distinctions drawn by the proposed ordinance with respect to the
limitations placed on the City's legislative power to enact protective or
corrective legislation regarding homosexuals [or] bisexuals "145
Furthermore, the Citizens court, while acknowledging that Reitman was
"based on a finding that the actual intent of the provision challenged was to
foster and promote discrimination, and this finding was held to justify the
decision,"'46 noted that the intent factor was also present in Citizens as the
"proposed initiative ordinance is plainly designed to encourage discrimination
which was previously forbidden by city council-enacted legislation."'47 The
court stated further that "[e]ven insofar as the initiative may appear facially
neutral in those provisions which treat all sexual orientations similarly, the
claim of actual neutrality as to effect must be rejected.' 48 The court
supported this contention with the fact that the "Notice of Intent to Circulate,"
which was required by the Election Code to set forth the reasons for the
petition, made the true intent of the initiative crystal clear in that all the
proposed initiative was lacking was "a sack of stones for throwing." 149
Accordingly, the court in Citizens held that the proposed initiative was
constitutionally deficient in that the classifications it sought to draw resulted
in "real, substantial and invidious denial of the equal protection of the
laws." 1o
4) The portion of the ordinance set forth in (3), supra, may be affected only by an ordinance
adopted pursuant to the initiative procedure.
5) "No City- monies may be used directly or indirectly to fund any individual, activity or
organization which promotes, encourages, endorses, legitimizes or justifies homosexual
conduct."
6) An existing ordinance including sexual orientation as a subject to be addressed by a
community relations commission is amended to delete the reference to sexual orientation
Id. at 1019-20.
143. Id. at 1026.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1027.
146. Id. at 1029.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1031. The Notice of Intent to Circulate listed numerous diseases which it said was
endemic among homosexuals, described homosexual conduct including "oral-anal sex, group orgies,
bondage, engaging in fisting, rimming, ingesting urine and feces, and gerbling").
150. Id. at 1027 (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393).
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III. COLORADO AMENDMENT Two AND
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
On November 3, 1992, the Colorado voters passed Colorado Amendment
Two, a state ballot measure which amends article 2 of the state constitution
to include section 30, reading as follows:
Neither the State of Colorado through any of its branches or departments,
nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school
districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or
policy whereby homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct,
practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or
entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status,
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This section
of the Constitution shall be self-executing.'
The effect of Amendment Two is two-fold. Immediately, the amendment
repeals existing anti-bias ordinances in the towns of Aspen, Boulder, and
Denver. These ordinances protect gays, lesbians, and bisexuals from
discrimination. 152 Prospectively, the amendment prevents the enactment of
future anti-bias legislation.
While perhaps at least some in Colorado feel this type of amendment is a
valid exercise of the majority's rights in a democracy,"53 the amendment
cuts against an abundance of federal precedents in the area of state-authorized
discrimination, the effect of which denies a particular group equal access to
the political process. 54 As stated by then Solicitor General Thurgood
Marshall, while speaking to the concerns raised in Reitman, "by sheltering the
right to discriminate in its constitution, the State has accorded it a unique
insulation from the normal political processes, both locally and at the State
level [As such, this] violates the constitutional comm nd of strict
neutrality ,155
Although enforcement of this specific amendment has been enjoined
pending a trial on the merits, 56 the Supreme Court will soon have the
opportunity to hear and decide the constitutionality of Amendment Two.
157
151. Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV-7223, 1993 WL 15174, at *4 (D. Colo. Jan. 15, 1993).
152. Lows Sahagun, Colorado Seeks to Stave Off Tourism Boycott by Gays, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10,
1992, at Al.
153. Jana Mazanec, Colorado to Appeal Gay-Rights Decision, USA TODAY, Jan. 18, 1993, at 10A.
"No matter what we do, the majority vote is taken away. [I]t's as if we don't count, as if this isn't
a democracy." Id. (quoting Colorado Springs resident Ron Hem on his reaction to the Colorado District
Court Judge Bayless' decision to prelimnnarily enjoin Amendment Two from taking effect).
154. See supra part II.
155. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 26, Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)
(No. 483).
156. Passed by voter initiative on November 3, 1992, the amendment was scheduled to take effect
on January 15, 1993. Since then, however, Denver District Court Judge Jeffrey H. Bayless has
preliminarily enjoined its enforcement. Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV-7223, 1993 WL 15174, at *12 (D.
Colo. Jan. 15, 1993). The decision to enjoin enforcement of the amendment was later affirmed on appeal
by the Colorado Supreme Court on July 19, 1993. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993).
157. On July 20, 1993, Governor Romer, the named defendant in the suit challenging the
constitutionality of the amendment, announced plans to appeal the ruling of Colorado's Supreme Court
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Assuming certiorari is granted, this eventual appeal to the Supreme Court will
provide the Court with an opportunity to clear the confusion regarding the
proper standard of review to apply to classifications based on sexual
orientation."' 8 For instance, although several lower courts have recently held
that classifications based on sexual orientation are subject to strict judicial
scrutiny, each case was later affirmed or reversed on other grounds, thereby
avoiding the inevitable question of which standard of review to use.1
59
Likewise, an appeal will allow the Court to declare a fundamental right to
participate equally in the normal political process, irrespective of the
classification drawn.
As for the merits on appeal, the Court will be presented with several options
for striking down Amendment Two as unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, the Court could declare
the amendment unconstitutional because it draws a classification for disparate
treatment that is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
This rational basis determination could be reached in light of City of
Cleburne, as modified, if at all, by Heller 160 Moreover, the Court could
support such a conclusion through applying the law of Reitman and its
progeny,' 6 ' as brought to life in the area of state-authorized invidious
discrimination against homosexuals by the Citizens court.162 Such invalida-
tion could be further supported by the decisions in Pruitt, Dahl, and
Meinhold, 63 as no "truly" rational basis could exist for excepting this class
of citizens from the equal protection of the laws.
Second, the Court could proclaim that Hardwick was not dispositive of
whether sexual orientation was a suspect classification for equal protection
purposes.164 Here, the Court would acknowledge that, in reality, the effect
of Amendment Two renders the defined class without voice in seeking
legislative protection. Thus, support for the application of heightened scrutiny
is found in the fact that Amendment Two negates the processes of democracy
which would otherwise provide the remedy for imprudent acts by the
legislature, the people, or both. Accordingly, the built-in system of checks
addressed in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,165 which often
justifies the Court's employment of rational basis review, has been denied to
the affected class by this amendment. As a result, homosexuals and bisexuals,
at least in Colorado, have become politically powerless, disabled by a state
ballot initiative which denies them legislative redress. Consequently,
to the United States Supreme Court. Appeal Planned in Anti-Gay Controversy; Colorado Supreme Court
Bars Amendment Voiding Homosexual Rights, WASH. POsT, July 21, 1993, at AI2.
158. See supra part I.B. for a discussion of the application of heightened scrutiny to classifications
based on sexual orientation.
159. See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
160. See supra part I.C.
161. See supra part II.A.
162. See supra part II.B.
163. See supra part I.C.
164. See supra part I.B.
165. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
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Amendment Two is not "suitably tailored to serve a compelling state
interest."'
166
Finally, the Court could delay the question of the proper standard of review
to be applied to classifications based on sexual orientation by simply declaring
that Colorado Amendment Two violates a fundamental right to participate
equally in the political process irrespective of the class drawn by the
amendment. The Court could reach this decision with relative ease as
Amendment Two does more than strip members of the affected class of anti-
bias protections; the amendment specifically denies the class its voice in the
political process. Enactment of this amendment on the part of the state is
"designed to make private discriminations legally possible."' 67 As such, the
amendment "constitutes a real, substantial, and invidious denial of the equal
protection of the laws."' 16 ' The amendment subjects homosexuals and
bisexuals to a "debilitating and often insurmountable disadvantage."
169
Accordingly, the Court could adopt the Colorado Supreme Court's reasoning
in Evans170 and strike down the amendment as it impinges upon a funda-
mental right to participate equally in the normal political process.
In short, Colorado Amendment Two constitutionalizes the private biases of
the majority at the expense of the rights of specific minorities, namely
homosexuals and bisexuals in Colorado. Not only do the amendment and
legislative actions of this type insulate homosexuals and bisexuals from the
right to engage in normal political processes, they directly involve the state
in impermissible and unconstitutional invidious discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Ballot initiatives like Colorado's Amendment Two leave little doubt of the
grave concerns raised in light of the apparently increasing intolerance of
alternative lifestyles in this country The majority's fencing out of a
politically unpopular group and denying it access to and protection from the
very political processes that had previously enacted legislation for its
protection mandates that courts subject classifications based on sexual
orientation to a higher standard of scrutiny Yet, regardless of whether
heightened scrutiny afforded to the classification in this situation is forthcom-
ing, Amendment Two should fail because it directly infringes upon a
fundamental right to participate equally in the normal political process. The
State's desire to deny a particular group the ability to seek legislative
protection from invidious discrimination cannot be said to constitute a
compelling government interest. "[T]he State cannot so disadvantage the
166. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Livig Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); see also supra notes
18-21 and accompanying text.
167. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 375 (1967); see also supra part II.A.
168. Hunter v. Enckson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969).
169. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 484 (1982).
170. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993); see supra notes 130-39 and accompanying text.
1993]
298 1NDL4NA LAW JOURNAL
victims of invidious personal discrimination. '7
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171. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 27, Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)
(No. 483).
